Seriously, who would simulate me?

From time to time I run across something that just shocks me, not because of the thing itself, but because the thing is so completely something I should have known about and yet have somehow missed. How does a philosophy argument about things that interest me greatly go on for years without my hearing about it?

Today’s example of this is Nick Bostrom’s Simulation Argument.

How could I have missed this? It’s so completely in my wheelhouse, and it’s been around forever in Internet time1, and yet it’s something that I’ve just encountered for the first time this week.

You can follow the link over to the Simulation Argument page for the original paper, a myriad of related information, and some commentary.

The argument essentially says that if you assume that our society has a decent chance of surviving to the “posthuman” stage, and that you assume that posthuman civilizations (or at least some small number of members thereof) would be interested in running a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history, then it follows that the odds are very good that you are actually living in a simulation. (Actually, he kind of makes the reverse argument that if you don’t think it’s likely that we’re in a simulation, then you must believe that either we won’t make it to posthuman, or that no posthumans would be interested in doing simulations, but the forward case will work for starting a discussion.)

The logic is pretty inexorable: a posthuman civilization has access to adequate processing power to run a very, very large number of simulations very easily, even if only one individual is doing it (and obviously, a larger effort at the simulations would mean a correspondingly larger number of them being run). The number of simulations rapidly outnumbers the number of actual people, and suddenly it’s more likely that any given experience is that of a simulation than an actual ancestor.

In the source paper, Bostrom goes into some detail on this, but if you don’t want the whole paper, but can take a two page summary to make this clearer, Bostrom has provided one.

I don’t know how I missed this: probability theory, the old “brain in the vat” thing, posthuman/post-Singularity speculations, etc. It’s right up my alley. Hell, you could argue that it’s tangentially related to Russell’s travels through phenomenalism.

Oh, and my favourite bit of the original paper?

It may be possible for simulated civilizations to become posthuman. They may then run their own ancestor-simulations on powerful computers they build in their simulated universe. Such computers would be “virtual machines”, a familiar concept in computer science. (Java script web-applets, for instance, run on a virtual machine – a simulated computer – inside your desktop.) Virtual machines can be stacked: it’s possible to simulate a machine simulating another machine, and so on, in arbitrarily many steps of iteration. If we do go on to create our own ancestor-simulations, this would be strong evidence against (1) and (2), and we would therefore have to conclude that we live in a simulation. Moreover, we would have to suspect that the posthumans running our simulation are themselves simulated beings; and their creators, in turn, may also be simulated beings.

That’s like a PKD short story in one paragraph.

I’m definitely going to have to chew through the rest of Bostrom’s stuff now.

  1. This means “since 2003″ in this case.(back)

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3 Responses to “Seriously, who would simulate me?”

  1. Kira Says:
    1

    The flaw is in assuming that a posthuman civilization would necessarily be interested in running such simulations. Odds, I would argue, are not good - they are by definition smart enough and knowledgeable enough that their need for such a thing would be unlikely at best.

  2. Mr. McLaren Says:
    2

    Well, it’s not a “flaw” per se, since the argument is of the form “if 1 & 2 then necessarily 3″, not an assertion of 1 & 2.

    But, he has pretty convincing argument in the original paper about just that point–essentially you need to think not “the societies as a whole would not be interested in doing this”, but rather “not a single entity would be interested in doing so”. Here’s the bit:

    The second alternative in the simulation argument’s conclusion is that the fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor-simulation is negligibly small. In order for (2) to be true, there must be a strong convergence among the courses of advanced civilizations. If the number of ancestor-simulations created by the interested civilizations is extremely large, the rarity of such civilizations must be correspondingly extreme. Virtually no posthuman civilizations decide to use their resources to run large numbers of ancestor-simulations. Furthermore, virtually all posthuman civilizations lack individuals who have sufficient resources and interest to run ancestor-simulations; or else they have reliably enforced laws that prevent such individuals from acting on their desires.

    What force could bring about such convergence? One can speculate that advanced civilizations all develop along a trajectory that leads to the recognition of an ethical prohibition against running ancestor-simulations because of the suffering that is inflicted on the inhabitants of the simulation. However, from our present point of view, it is not clear that creating a human race is immoral. On the contrary, we tend to view the existence of our race as constituting a great ethical value. Moreover, convergence on an ethical view of the immorality of running ancestor-simulations is not enough: it must be combined with convergence on a civilization-wide social structure that enables activities considered immoral to be effectively banned.Another possible convergence point is that almost all individual posthumans in virtually all posthuman civilizations develop in a direction where they lose their desires to run ancestor-simulations. This would require significant changes to the motivations driving their human predecessors, for there are certainly many humans who would like to run ancestor-simulations if they could afford to do so. But perhaps many of our human desires will be regarded as silly by anyone who becomes a posthuman. Maybe the scientific value of ancestor-simulations to a posthuman civilization is negligible (which is not too implausible given its unfathomable intellectual superiority), and maybe posthumans regard recreational activities as merely a very inefficient way of getting pleasure – which can be obtained much more cheaply by direct stimulation of the brain’s reward centers. One conclusion that follows from (2) is that posthuman societies will be very different from human societies: they will not contain relatively wealthy independent agents who have the full gamut of human-like desires and are free to act on them.

  3. Homo Sum » Blog Archive » Yes, I just made up the term “Doom Constant” Says:
    3

    [...] Nick Bostrom? And remember the Drake [...]

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